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iAbstract
Negotiation is a process where agents aim to work through disputes and
maximize their surplus. As the use of deep reinforcement learning in bar-
gaining games is unexplored, this paper evaluates its ability to exploit,
adapt, and cooperate to produce fair outcomes, in comparison to classical
game theoretic results.
Two actor-critic networks were trained for the bidding and acceptance
strategy, against time-based agents, behavior-based agents, and through self-
play. Gameplay against these agents reveals three key findings. 1) Neural
agents learn to exploit time-based agents, achieving clear transitions in de-
cision preference values. The Cauchy distribution emerges as suitable for
sampling offers, due to its peaky center and heavy tails. The kurtosis and
variance sensitivity of the probability distributions used for continuous con-
trol produce trade-offs in exploration and exploitation. 2) Neural agents
demonstrate adaptive behavior against different combinations of conces-
sion, discount factors, and behavior-based strategies. 3) Most importantly,
neural agents learn to cooperate with other behavior-based agents, in cer-
tain cases utilizing non-credible threats to force fairer results. This bears
similarities with reputation-based strategies in the evolutionary dynamics,
and departs from equilibria in classical game theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Negotiation is the process where parties interact to settle issues, discover
surplus, and create contracts. Because negotiation is so essential to society,
it has been widely studied by different fields, in economics [54, 58], artificial
intelligence [34, 35, 26], business [82, 38, 20, 30], communication [5, 43], and
behavioral psychology [64, 17].
However, negotiation is typically very costly. Automated negotiation
is a field that, for the past 20 years, has promised to reduce the costs of
human negotiation, avoid social confrontation, and augmented the abilities
of human negotiators. It has found great success in e-commerce and sup-
ply chain management [21]. Recent success in deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) in games, such as Chess [71], Go [72], Poker [10] and Atari games [48]
have inspired DRL’s application to complex human tasks, including negoti-
ation [39]. However, the direct application of DRL on negotiation, formally
known as bargaining games within game theory, is unexplored. The central
goal of this dissertation is to understand the behavioral dynamics of negoti-
ation bots trained with DRL, and assess its ability to exploit, adapt, and
cooperate.
Beyond reducing costs, understanding the behavior of DRL agents is
paramount because, with the deployment of any technology, there comes
potential harm. When DRL was applied to natural language generation for
negotiation, agents were shown to misrepresent their intentions within ne-
gotiation dialogues [39]. As natural language generation techniques mature,
it is easy to imagine a future where complex transactions, contracts, and ne-
gotiations are facilitated through bots. Already, more than 80% of WeChat
transactions are mediated through chatbots and conversational marketing—
the use of customized chatbots in marketing— has been forecasted as the
most dominant interface between consumers and businesses [19]. As it is
well-established that suppliers hold more information that buyers [3], DRL
bots may exploit asymmetries when mediating markets, exposing consumers
to representational harm.
1
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To be explicit about our problem, Baarslag divides negotiation into
three pillars— the bidding strategy, opponent modeling, and acceptance strat-
egy. This dissertation evaluates the extent in which actor-critic models can
learn end-to-end bidding and acceptance strategies through gameplay, solely
through the opponent’s behaviors alone. As mentioned prior, the three be-
havioral traits of interest are exploitation (ability to utilize an opponent’s
weaknesses), adaptation (ability to play against different opponents), and
cooperation (ability to work with other agents for fairer and more effi-
cient results). Related sub-problems include 1) when sub-optimal bidding
results occur, 2) what the variables that produce these limitations are, and
3) how neural agents learn fair strategies against more complicated agents.
The emergence of fairness is often studied through the lens of game the-
ory [81, 80]; we adopt a similar approach for analysing our agent’s behavior.
This project aims predominately to contribute to automated negotia-
tion. We contribute by implementing DRL within the bargaining domain,
through competition against time-based agents, tit-for-tat agents, and self-
play. The first half of the results focuses on precision— the agent’s mechanics
and exploitative abilities, whereas the second half on behavioral dynamics.
There are three key results for behavior. First, we demonstrate exploitative
and adaptive behavior against time-based agents and the simple behavioral
agent, showing clear switching behavior in both acceptance and bid strat-
egy, up to 80% and 90% (Pareto) efficiency respectively. Second, the neural
network cooperates with more complex behavior-based agents to produce
fairer results. Furthermore, in a game where agents are allowed to accrue
interest, it learns to cooperate during self-play. Third, and most interest-
ingly, results demonstrate the emergence of fairness through the adoption of
non-credible threats This is considered irrational in classic game theory. We
draw a comparison to results in evolutionary game theory, where a similar
divergence from assumptions of rationality.
Additionally, we contribute an analysis that features contemporary re-
inforcement learning research directions [4]— negotiation with deadlines is
synonymous with the cliff-walking problem and construing offers aligns with
control over continuous state space. Using derivative-based analysis based
on marginal utility for optimal stopping, I demonstrate a negative relation-
ship between time error and the second derivative. Secondly, successful
continuous control on this domain requires careful control over exploration
and exploitation— the Cauchy distribution arises as a candidate due to its
peaky center, heavy tails, and sensitivity to change in variance.
Chapter 2
Background and Terminology
Due to the expensive nature of negotiation, attention to automating the
process has gained considerable traction in the past twenty years [8], since
the development of Contract Net Protocol by Smith in the 1980s [75]. It
spurned the promise of finding better outcomes than human negotiators [9,
18, 32, 55, 79, 41].
Baarslag [6] identifies three key aspects of negotiation strategy— bidding
strategy, opponent modeling, acceptance strategy. The bidding strategy asks
what concessions to make in the process of counter-offering. The acceptance
strategy asks when and which offers should be accepted. Opponent modeling
focuses on understanding what the opponent wants, in order to make better
decisions about bidding and acceptance.
Negotiation is simultaneously collaborative and competitive. A good
negotiation outcome is characterized by 1) win-win situations 2) avoiding no
agreement, 3) and avoiding exploitation [6]. While the first two activities are
collaborative, the third is competitive. Negotiators are typically unwilling
to share information in fear of being exploited [51, 14, 58]. Thus, one main
challenge of negotiation is overcoming the information barrier, which makes
bargaining a game of incomplete information.
Therefore, opponent modeling can be regarded as the most important in
the field of negotiation . Like poker, successful negotiation arises from under-
standing your opponent and generating profits off their behavioral heuristics
and weaknesses. Especially given the diversity of negotiation agents, it is
difficult to produce a singular agent that plays well against multiple oppo-
nent typologies. Therefore, a focus of the field is less on optimal play, but
exploitative play using adaptive agents [6].
Before reviewing the state-of-the-art, we layout the necessary terminol-
ogy for negotiation, beginning with the mechanism, measures of fairness and
optimality, then discuss the common negotiation strategies used to bench-
mark negotiation models.
3
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2.1 Overview of Negotiation
A negotiation setting contains a protocol, agents, and scenario. The protocol
determines the rules of how agents interact with each other. The scenario
takes place in a negotiation domain which determines an outcome space,
denoted as Ω. A negotiation domain can have a single or multiple issues.
Issues refer to the resources under contention, such as the price of an object
or level of service. Thus, an outcome ω ∈ Ω can be described as a specific
division of the issues. Agents have preference profiles, which determines
specific outcomes they prefer.
2.1.1 Protocols
We use single-issue bargaining as a preliminary illustration. Given a unit pie,
two players A and B are asked to split it amongst themselves [24]. Suppose
Agents A and B negotiate N rounds to divide a unit pie, by alternately
proposing outcomes called bids or offers, until a player accepts. We denote
an offer x = (x, y), such that x+ y = 1.
This process of alternating offers is known as the Rubenstein’s Bargain-
ing Protocol. Games with one round, are known as an ultimatum game [65].
In ultimatum games, A makes the first and only proposal. B can only accept
or reject it, which means A has all the power. Similarly, if there are two
rounds, then Player B has the advantage. In a game of repeated offers, it is
necessary to introduce some form of discounting factor— otherwise, players
would negotiate forever. The discount factor δ makes a portion of the pie
go bad at every round. Thus, it is in the best interest for players to finish
the game as soon as possible.
The Rubenstein Bargaining Protocol is widely used because it accurately
simulates many real-world scenarios [65]. Multi-issue bargaining is more
complex, as multiple issues are under contention and requires further proto-
col restrictions describe how each issue is resolved. Common ones are [35]:
1. Package-deal Procedure: All issues addressed at once.
2. Simultaneous Procedure: All issues are solved independently. It
is equivalent to m single-issue problems.
3. Sequential Procedure: Negotiates one issue at a time, with a
predetermined sequence. Cannot negotiate prior or future issues.
An alternative protocol is the monotonic concession protocol [63], where
agents disclose information about how they value each issue, and their sub-
sequent offers must have less utility than their prior ones. Other protocol
considerations include [23]:
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1. Time Constraints: Beyond the discount factor δ, there is often a
deadline T . If negotiation does not end by T , players earn 0 utility
(known as the conflict deal).
2. Divisibility: Issues may be atomic and discrete, or divisible and con-
tinuous.
3. Lateral-ness: Whether negotiation is between two parties (bilateral)
or with multiple parties (multilateral).
4. Reserve Price r: The minimum an agent is willing to accept.
2.1.2 The Scenario
The utility is defined as the cumulative utility,: a combination of sub-utility
functions. Most commonly used is the linear additivity. With ~x the division
for Player A (PA) and ~y for Player B (PB), the aggregate utility is of PA is:
U1(x, t) =

δt−1 ~W T~x =
m∑
i=1
wi,axiδ
t−1 if t ≤ T
0 otherwise (Conflict Deal)
(2.1)
where wi,a is the value (weight) PA ascribes to issue i, δ the discount rate,
and xi the division for issue i. This can be viewed as the discounted dot
product of weights ~W and issue division x. In many cases, however, utilities
are not linear in combination— for instance, in the auctions of multiple
items, combinations of items yield greater rewards, to the effect of the sum
being greater than the parts, due to synergistic effects. These are modeled
with non-linear utility functions [31].
The action space is defined by three possible actions: Ai = {Offer(x,y),
reject, accept}. Offers are made after rejections, and should an agent choose
to accept an offer the negotiation ends. Each issue is often normalized such
that xi + yi = 1. For games with only one issue, the offer consists of the
division of one pie. For multiple issues, offers are represented as vectors,
subject to ~x+ ~y = 1. For this dissertation, the outcome space is assumed to
continuous, linear, and normalized.
2.1.3 Outcome Spaces
Each player has a preference ordering, called the preference profiles, on all
possible outcomes. An outcome ω′ is weakly preferred to ω if u(ω′) ≥ u(ω),
which is denoted ω′ ≥ ω. Similarly, ω′ is strictly preferred to ω (denoted
ω′ > ω) if u(ω′) > u(ω). For linear additive utilities, the preference profile
can be inferred directly by the weights.
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Now we present metrics used to evaluate our three criterion. An outcome
is called Pareto Optimal if there exists no outcome ω′ that a player would
prefer without worsening their opponent’s outcome. Formally:
(ω′ >A ω ∧ ω′ ≥B ω) ∨ (ω′ >B ω ∧ ω′ ≥A ω)
The Pareto Frontier describes all Pareto optimal solutions, which we denote
as ΩP . When an offer is not Pareto Optimal, then through negotiation there
is potential to reach an outcome without players conceding anything.
There are two other useful metrics. Let ωP ∈ ΩP denote the set of
outcomes that are Pareto optimal. The bid distribution denotes the mean
distance to the Pareto frontier, shown in Eq. 2.2. A high bid distribution
indicates bids are on average far away.
BD(Ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
min d(ω, ωP )
|Ω| (2.2)
Usually, simultaneous maximization of outcomes is not possible, as there
is a region of disagreement between players. Another useful metric is the
product of utilities (UA · UB), known as the Nash Product. A fair outcome
is often characterized using the Nash solution, the outcome that maximizes
the product of utilities, shown in Eq. 2.3.
ωNash = max
ω∈Ω
UA(ω) · UB(ω) (2.3)
2.2 Strategies
In cases of perfect information, it is possible to determine the optimal bid-
ding strategy [23]. However, as previously mentioned, perfect information
is unlikely in bargaining as agents are unwilling to give away their prefer-
ences in fear of exploitation. This motivates the development of negotiation
tactics under imperfect information. These negotiation tactics can broadly
be classified as time-dependent or behavior-dependent tactics, based on a
decision-function that maps state to a target utility.
2.2.1 Baseline Strategies
Two are commonly used. The Hardliner always bids maximum utility for
itself, which emulates the "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude. The Random walker
denotes agents that bid randomly, serving as a standard baseline.
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2.2.2 Time-dependent Strategies
Time-dependent Strategies denote functions that produce offers solely based
on time. At every round, the agent calculates their decision utility which
determines whether they accept an offer or not. For time-dependent agents,
this is:
u(t) = Pmin + (Pmax − Pmin)(˙1− F (t)) (2.4)
Pmax and Pmin ∈ [0, 1], thus parametrizing the range of the offers. Fre-
quently, F (t) is parametrized as an exponential function:
F (t) = k + (1− k) · ( t
T
)1/c (2.5)
where c is the concession factor. k is often set to 0 for simplicity. Fig. 2.1
shows the decision utilities of different agents. If 0 < c < 1, then the agent
concedes towards the end and is known as Boulware. Otherwise, if c ≥ 1,
the agent concedes quickly and offers its reservation value, thus it is known
as a Conceder. c = 1 means the agent’s decision utility decreases linearly.
Figure 2.1: Decision utilities of time-based agents with different concession fac-
tors.
2.2.3 Behavior-based Strategies
Behavior-dependent and imitative bidding strategies observe the behavior
of the opponent to make their own decisions on what to offer and what
to accept. The most well-known is tit-for-tat, which produces cooperation
through reciprocity. It’s three central mantras are 1) never defect first (play
nice as long as the opponent plays nice), 2) retaliate if provoked and 3) can
forgive after retaliation.
In negotiation, the relative tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy reciprocates by of-
fering concessions proportional to their opponent’s concessions from δ rounds
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY 8
prior:
x
tn+1
a→b [j] = min
(
max
(
x
tn−2δ
b→a [j]
x
tn−2δ+2
b→a [j]
x
tn−1
a→b [j],
a
min
j
)
,
amax
j
)
(2.6)
Here, xtn+1a→b [j] is the offer for issue j. This value is determined by the ratio
of the opponent’s prior concessions, which then scales the agent’s own prior
offer xtn−1a→b [j]. The min and max values ensure offer values are within range.
2.3 State-of-the-Art in Negotiation
Machine learning methods in the domain of negotiation can be broadly sep-
arated into the following types: Bayesian learning, non-linear regression,
kernel density estimation, and artificial neural networks. These methods
have been applied to mostly model an opponent’s (acceptance and bidding)
strategy, then derive an analytic response. This is because if an agent knows
the opponent’s bidding strategy, then the agent can compute its optimal
strategy [6].
For estimating the opponent acceptance strategy, techniques can be
siloed into the estimation of individual variables. Zeng and Sycara pro-
vide a popular and intuitive Bayesian approach for estimating the reserve
price, using historical data. The model generates a set of hypotheses on
the opponent’s reserve price, then attaches a likelihood using the history.
The estimate is a weighted sum of the hypotheses based on their likeli-
hoods [87]. This technique has been adapted to estimate the deadline for
time-dependent tactics [74]. In general, acceptance strategy estimation uses
some form of Bayesian learning [78, 86, 73, 27, 62], augmented with non-
linear regression [2, 86, 74, 28, 29], kernel density estimates [22, 55, 14],
polynomial interpolation [66], genetic algorithms [46, 33], and more recently
neural networks [21].
In contrast, neural methods have been applied much more aggressively to
the bidding strategy [6]. In simpler cases where the general bidding formula
is known, regression is sufficient as the problem reduces down to parameter
estimation. If no formula is known, then neural networks are employed to
approximate the opponent’s bid strategy, typically using a large database
of bid history. Oprea [53] uses a time-series approach on single-issue nego-
tiations, taking in only the opponent’s current bid. By 2008, early efforts
for opponent move prediction using neural networks [11], who focused on
predicting human bidding strategies. This was particularly relevant in e-
commerce and supply chain management, as forecasting bids is useful in
determining automated strategies [37, 12, 49]. When the domain is general,
researchers have found success using deep learning with multilayer percep-
trons. Masvoula shows reliable predictions using single deep networks both
with and without historical knowledge [45, 44]. Papaioannou and Rau et al.
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have shown the concession factor and weight of each issue can be predicted
if the opponent is known to be time-dependent, using multilayer neural
nets [57, 61] or single layer, radial basis function neural nets [56].
Reinforcement learning approaches to negotiation began as early as the
late 20th century, often denoted as adaptive learning [60]. Today DRL has
more frequently been used with natural language processing [25, 15]. Lewis
et al. implement an end-to-end DRL negotiation dialogue generator [39].
They curated a set of human-human dialogues with Mechanical Turk, then
trained on four gated recurrent units [13], a type of long-short term memory
neural net [50]. However, this study focuses on emulating human language,
with less concern on optimality— for instance, their DRL agent present
58.6% and 69.1% Pareto Optimality against simple autonomous agents and
humans respectively, on a very limited, discrete action space (around 200
offers).
As illustrated with this brief survey, there is an immense number of
agent designs for negotiation. The primary weakness in best performing
models, such as Bayesian models in acceptance or bid prediction, is they
require specific domain assumptions and architectures. Another weakness is
for these negotiators to perform well in populations of different strategies,
an additional opponent classifier is needed, which introduces further uncer-
tainty. Additionally, opponents can use more complex behavioral strategies
and mixed strategies— pure strategies associated with a probability—that
requires higher levels of adaptability to play against.
All of this motivates an adaptive agent with a fixed architecture that can
perform well against different opponents. An end-to-end negotiation agent
is desirable as the only required input is the offer, time step, and public
knowledge, and can adapt online during gameplay. Although deep learning
often comes at the expense of explainability, a fixed architecture playing end-
to-end means we do not need additional classifiers and assumptions about
the opponent. The success of AlphaZero in chess is largely because it did
not rely on hand-crafted heuristics and assumptions like other engines [72];
likewise, Libratus learned to exploit specific human opponent idiosyncrasies
in poker [10]. An end-to-end, adaptive neural agent is the analogous solution
for negotiation. It is a convenient coincidence that the negotiation domain
also aligns with the current interest in continuous control positions deep
reinforcement learning.
Chapter 3
Methods
Each bilateral negotiation scenario takes these as an input: two utility
weights w1 and w2, discount factors δ, a deadline of 20, reserve price of
0, and two agents. These two agents then negotiate to an agreement or
disagreement (conflict deal). For simplicity, our agent’s utility weights are
(1, 2, 3) whereas the opponent’s is (3, 2, 1). Experiments consist of the neural
agent playing against a second agent until reaching stopping criteria.
3.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning is formally the study of n-agent stochas-
tic games [70], described as a tuple (N,S, ~A, ~R, T ). N is the number of
agents. S is the set of states and ~A = A1, . . . , An, with each Ai the set of
actions agent i can take. In the most basic case, by treating the environment
as static, the single-agent Q-learning algorithm developed by [83] gives
the optimal policy in an MDP with unknown reward and transition.
Q(s, a)+ = α[R(s, a) + γV (s′)] V (s) ← max
a∈A
Q(s, a) (3.1)
Q(s, a) estimates the value of taking action a when on state s, and V (s) the
value of the state by taking the best action. Extension of this paradigm to
multiple agents is difficult. One approach is to assume the environment as
passive, each agent with their own reward and transition functions. However,
this falsely assumes agent actions do not influence each other [69]. Another
approach is to define the Q−value function over all agents actions, but
introduces a dynamic programming challenge in updating V .
In recent years, reinforcement learning has been applied successfully in
conjunction with deep learning, using deep neural networks to approximate
value functions. A breakthrough comes from policy-gradient methods. Tra-
ditionally, RL algorithms are action-value methods: after learning values of
the action, algorithms select actions based on the estimated action values.
10
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In contrast, policy-gradient methods learn a parametric policy without con-
sulting the value function [76]. By policy we mean an agents strategy—
what it does at a given state and time.
Additionally, in cases where the environment is dynamic, it may be opti-
mal to acquire a stochastic policy— a probability distribution over possible
actions. This distribution is updated to associate actions with higher ex-
pected rewards with higher probability values. Since probabilities can be
over discrete or continuous action spaces, DRL is a useful control frame-
work for negotiation, as the decision to accept or reject an offer is discrete,
whereas bidding is on continuous space (on [0, 1]n given n issues).
3.1.1 Policy Gradients
Call the policy pi and let parameters θ define a probability distribution. The
probability of action a is denoted as pi(a|s, θ) = P{At = a|St = s, θt = θ},
that is, the probability of taking action a at time t given that the state
s and parameters θ. Similarly, a learned value function, such as using a
neural network to approximate the value, can be represented as vˆ(s, w),
where w ∈ Rd is its weights.
As with action-value RL, policy parameters are optimized to maximize
a scalar performance measure J(θ):
J(θ) = E[
T−1∑
t=0
rt+1] (3.2)
which describes the expected future aggregate rewards (sum of rewards from
t = 0 until the end). The policy values are updated according to J through
gradient ascent:
θt+1 = θt + αĴ(θt)
For discrete actions, actions are selected by estimating a numerical pref-
erence value or logit h(s, a, θ), based on the state, action, and parameter
values (weights in a neural net). Actions are then selected using the soft-
max distribution:
pi(a|s, θ) = e
h(s,a,θ)
Σbeh(s,a,θ)
(3.3)
For instance, for the acceptance strategy, an agent can reject or stop. Asso-
ciate with these actions hR and hA respectively, and a stochastic policy is
defined.
However, updating the policy in respect to J requires the policy-gradient
theorem, which provides guaranteed improvements when updating the pol-
icy parameters [76]. The theorem states that change in performance is
proportional to the change in the policy, and a full statement is given in
Appendix A.1. The theorem yields a canonical policy-gradient algorithm—
REINFORCE [76, 84, 77]. The parameter updates is:
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θt+1 = θt + αGt
∇pi(at|st, θt)
pi(at|st, θt) (3.4)
where Gt is the observed reward. Intuitively, the update is the reward
multiplied by the gradient of the action probability divided by the action
probability. If Gt is high, this increases the chances of visiting that state in
the future. Note, the policy gradient is often expressed as ∇ ln pi(at|st, θt),
which yields the fraction through the chain rule.
3.1.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning for continuous variables
Secondly, actor-critic models are useful because they separate the policy
space and action space, which means policy selection can occur on a contin-
uous domain. For instance, in a uni-variate control problem, the choice of
action can be sampled from a normal distribution. The policy approxima-
tion with a normal distribution is:
pi(a | s, θ) = 1
σ(s, θ)
√
2pi
exp
(
− (a− µ(s, θ))
2
2σ(s, θ)2
)
During back-propogation, the θ values are updated such that µ and σ reflect
a better reward using the Equation 3.4.
3.2 Actor-Critic Implementation
We have arrived at our main method. Unlike REINFORCE, which only
learns a policy, actor-critic models simultaneously learn a value function
approximation and a policy. Intuitively, the value function critiques whether
an action undertaken by the policy is good, rather than being an absolute
measure. Thus, we make a modification to Equation 3.4, substituting the
reward Gt with the value estimate qˆ(st, at, ~wt) in Equation 3.5:
θt+1 = θt + α∇ ln pi(at|st, θt)qˆ(st, at, ~wt) (3.5)
The process of negotiation thus requires two actor-critic nets— one for the
acceptance strategy and another for the offer strategy. The algorithmic
procedure is shown in Fig. 3.1, with pseudo-code provided by Algorithm 3
in the Appendix. We use univariate and single-issue interchangeably, as
with multivariate and multi-issue. Next, we describe the architectures of
the acceptance and bidding strategy.
3.2.1 Acceptance Net Architecture
The first neural network approximates the accecptance strategy. For
the univariate case, the input x is a two-element vector consisting of the
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of training algorithm.
opponent’s offer and the current time step. For the multivariate case, the
input is four-dimensional.
Figure 3.2: Architecture of the Acceptance Strategy.
At every time step, Accept Net takes in the opponents offer, encodes it
to a 512 hidden state using two affine-Relu6 pairs. This base layer is shared
between the actor and value network, which facilitates a shared represen-
tation [47]. The actor takes in the embedded state and outputs two logit
values, which are softmaxed to choose the appropriate action. Similarly, the
value network outputs the expected reward estimate.
The Relu6 is a variant of the Relu functions (max{0, x}), but capped
at 6. Relu6 layers have been shown to train faster (due to the limit on
byte representation) and to encourage the learning of sparse features earlier
on [36]. This is important since gameplay is path-dependent and, against a
mixed set of opponents, states may be sparse, which we confirmed during
preliminary testing. Hyper-parameters were also chosen through testing,
reducing layers and the number of hidden states until training behavior
changed. The full architecture is shown in Fig. 3.2.
After playout, the critic loss is calculated by taking the mean-squared
error (MSE) of the temporal difference— the difference between the observed
rewards and the value network’s forward pass. Learning parameters are
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given in Table 3.1.
for Every Reward, State and Action do
TDLoss = Reward − qˆ(st, at, ~wt);
Closs = (TD Loss ;
LogProbs = lnP (a|pi);
Aloss = − LogProbs · TDLoss;
Backprop on Closs and Aloss;
end
Algorithm 1: Acceptance Net Actor-Critic Update
3.2.2 Offer Net Architecture
Next, assuming the agent has rejected the offer, the agent now takes in the
same input and decides a counter-offer. Since we have three issues and offers
operate on continuous space, the Offer Net must output a vector o ∈ [0, 1]3.
To do so, we implement DRL with continuous control, sampling from three
different three types of distributions: 1) multivariate Gaussian, 2) three beta
distribution and 3) three Cauchy distributions.
The multivariate Gaussian is parametrized by a vector of means ~µ and
covariance matrix Σ. However, a common assumption in deep learning is
that the neural network will capture interdependencies between variables.
Hence, an estimate of individual standard deviations along each dimension
will suffice. The probability density and policies are given explicitly below.
pi(a | s, θ) ∼ ~µ(s, θ),Σ(s, θ) fX(x1, x2, x3) =
exp
(− 12( ~X − ~µ)TΣ−1( ~X − ~µ))√
(pi3|Σ|
(3.6)
The beta distribution is defined on the [0, 1] interval, and defined by two
positive shape parameters α and β. This is useful as offers are held to a
finite span. The PDF is:
xα−1(1− x)β−1
B(α, β) with B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α+ β) (3.7)
where Γ denotes the gamma function (fractional factorial). Some useful
properties of the beta distribution include its intuitive mean and relatively
simple expression for variance:
E[X] = α
α+ β var[X] =
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1) (3.8)
Lastly, the Cauchy distribution is parametrized similarly to the normal
with µ and γ denoted more generally as location and scale. It’s density
function is given as :
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1
piγ(s, θ)
[
1 +
(
x−µ(s,θ)
γ(s,θ)
)2] (3.9)
The neural architecture follows the same actor-critic model described in
Section 3.2. A base layer inputs into the value network and six other neural
blocks, estimating the distribution parameters— three means (locations)
and sigmas (scale). For the beta distribution, these are estimates on α and
β. These six variables are then used to sample the offer, which serves as the
action used during loss calculation.
Offer = (o1, o2, o3, t) ∼ dist(θ, s) (3.10)
Figure 3.3: Architecture of the Offer Strategy for multivariate normals and
Cauchy distributions. For the beta distribution, the estimated variables were α
and β, and the final forward pass layer is a ReLu layer, instead of a Sigmoid.
The value network consists of seven layers of affine-Relu6 layers. Neural
estimates of the mean were conducted with two affine-Relu6 layers, followed
with an affine-sigmoid layer to constrain the output between 0 and 1. Sigma
estimates used one affine-Relu6 layer and one affine-sigmoid layer. For the
beta distribution, the network estimated three pairs of α and β. Since
α, β > 0, the final sigmoid layer was replaced with a Relu layer. Fig. 3.3
shows the architecture in full. Apart from a similar justification for the
use of Relus for Accept Net, Relus have documented success for continuous
control as well [40]. Hyper-parameter choice was chosen in a similar way.
Training was undertaken using Adam with learning parameters are given
jointly in Table 3.1. The exact computations for back-propagation are given
in Algorithm‘2. Note, because back-propagation occurs on a continuous
domain, log-probabilities of continuous density functions can be positive
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when variance is small.
for Every Reward, State and Action do
TDLoss = Reward − qˆ(st, at, ~wt);
Closs = (TDLoss )2 ;
LogProbsX = lnP (aX |pi);
AXloss = − (LogProbs + Entropy) · TDLoss;
Compute AYloss, AZloss;
Backprop on Closs, AXloss, AYloss, AZloss
end
Algorithm 2: Offer Net Actor-Critic Update
Here, the entropy is defined as = 0.5+log(2pi) · log(σY ). Adding entropy
introduces noise to enable action exploration. Also, high variance means
higher loss, so overtime, the variance decreases to improve the precision of
the evolved strategy.
Learning Rate Epochs Optimizer
Accept Net 3e− 5 to 5e− 5 8000 Adam
Offer Net (Gaussian & Cauchy) 1e− 4 to 5e− 4 4000 Adam
Offer Net (Beta) 1e− 3 5000 Adam
Self-Play 1e− 4 3000 Adam
Tit-for-tat 1e− 4 5000 Adam
Table 3.1: Deep Learning Training Parameters. Early stopping criteria was con-
vergence in play-out time for 500 epochs. This varied by the concession factor and
discount rate
3.2.3 Reward Scheme
Accept Net and Offer Net share the same reward scheme. With deadline T ,
value weights w, and final offer x, the reward given to the neural agent is:
Rt =
{
wTx if tf < T
−K if tf = T (conflict deal)
This reward function encourages the agent to increase its offer x but not
so much it forces a conflict deal and receives low reward. Unless specified,
−K = −1.
3.2.4 Self-Play: Characterizing Behaviors with Game The-
ory
Within bargaining game theory, a focus has been how mechanisms induce
norms of fairness, particularly from a branch of game theory called evolu-
tionary game theory (EGT). EGT originates from biology, where it studies
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the dominance of species through evolutionary pressure, and has been ex-
tended to behavioral economics to understand the evolution of behavioral
traits. Nowak et al. showed fairness could be induced if reputation was taken
into consideration for the repeated ultimatum game [52], where agents play
many one-round negotiations with other agents.
Their most important finding was that, if agents learned to reject offers
they deemed too low, a population of fair agents would emerge. Thus,
reputation refers to the trait of intentionally reject low offers, and has been
confirmed with computational and empirical results [59]. We implement a
similar study to compare results, using the neural actor-critic model instead
of evolutionary methods, and on multi-round negotiation rather than the
ultimatum game. Details of implementation are given in Section 4.4.2, where
we demonstrate a similar appearance of fairness.
3.2.5 Against Behavior-Based Agents
Lastly, we train our agent against two behavior-based agents. The first is
the relative tit-for-tat described in Section 2.2.3, and the decision function
in Eq. 2.6. Furthermore, we implement a Bayesian Tit-for-tat, by estimating
the opponent’s value weights. The Bayesian tit-for-tat agent first measures
the opponent’s concession using its own utility function. Then, it mirrors
the amount of concession. Finally, this offer is made as attractive as possible
using a Bayesian opponent model [7].
To do this, we first take the ratio of the opponent’s offer at t − δ and
t − δ − 1 to update the decision utility. If the opponent concedes, then we
concede; if they increase their share, we increase ours. Then, we estimate
the opponent’s utility weights as the mean value of their offers. For instance,
if an opponent offers [1, 1, 1] then [1, 1, 0], then the utility is estimated as
Vopp = [vx, vy, vz] = 6 ∗
t∑
i=0
[x, y, z]
x+ y + z (3.11)
We then implement the Simplex algorithm [16] to maximize this value, fixed
upon the decision utility we calculated prior. While this assumes the oppo-
nent makes concessions in particular (preference-based) fashion, it remains
a question whether the neural agent can uncover the correct concessions to
make.
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Theoretical Decision Utilities
4.1.1 Utility Moments
Before proceeding to results against time-based agents, we first derive the
theoretical optimal strategies. Denote the decision utility of the time-based
opponent as
Uopp(c, t) = Pres + (1− Pres)
(
1− ( t
T
)
1
c
)
This is in essence the same as Equation 2.5. In our case, Pmin is the reserve
price Pres and Pmax is normalized to 1. Then our utility is:
U(d) =
(
1− Uopp(c, t)
)
dt (4.1)
The maximal point must be one where the marginal utility ∂U∂t is 0. Before
we take the derivative of U(d), we first take the derivative of Uopp.
∂Uopp
∂t
= ∂
∂t
Pres + (1− Pres)(1− ( t
T
)
1
c
=
(
1− Pres
) ∂
∂t
(
1− ( t
T
) 1
c
)
= −1− Pres
cT
1
c
t
1−c
c
We then solve for our marginal utility by the product rule.
∂U
∂t
= dt ln d(1− Uopp) + dt
(
− ∂Uopp
∂t
)
= dt
(
ln d(1− Uopp) + 1− Pres
cT
1
c
t
1−c
c
) (4.2)
Setting the reserve price to 0 in our experiments, we can derive a much more
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elegant expression, as U(c, d, t) =
(
t
T
) 1
c
dt.
∂U
∂t
=
( 1
T
1
c
)(1
c
t
1−c
c dt + t
1
c dt ln d
)
= t
1
c dt
T
1
c
( 1
ct
+ ln d
)
(4.3)
It is a simple matter to check the second derivative is negative, hence the
expression for the condition for the maximal point is
t = −1
c ln d (4.4)
Interestingly, this value does not depend on the total time T and since
Pres is a linear transformation of the utility function, this optimal time de-
pends only on the concession factor and discount rate. The optimal stopping
time can be expressed as:
TOPT =
{
T if −1c ln d > T
−1
c ln d otherwise
(4.5)
The theoretical values are shown in Fig. 4.1. A strong phase transition
occurs along the −1c ln d , demarcated by the clearly lighter region.
Figure 4.1: Theoretical optimal stopping time over concession factor and discount
rate.
Additionally, we compute the second derivative of the utility, as it ac-
counts for the error analysis of neural agent in Section 4.2, and the n-th
moment for generality.
∂2U
∂t2
= d
t
T
1
c
(
(ln d)2t
1
c + ln d
c
t
1−c
c + 1
c
(
ln dt
1−c
c + 1− c
c
t
1−2c
c
))
= d
t
T
1
c
(
(ln d)2t
1
c + 2 ln d
c
t
1−c
c + 1− c
c2
t
1−2c
c
) (4.6)
∂nU
∂tn
= d
t
T
1
c
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(ln d)n−i 1
ci
( i∏
j=1
1− (j − 1)c
)
t
1−ic
c (4.7)
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Figure 4.2: Outcome space of Negotiation. Fig. 4.2a) shows the outcome space at
t = 1. The vertices of the outcome space polytope is mapped from the vertices of the
action space, at (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1). Fig. 4.2b) shows the evolution of
the polytope over time, with a discount rate of 0.9. The decision to counter-offer is
made by the subsequent time-step, rather than the current. The colors denote the
Nash Product, with the Nash solution lying at (4, 4).
4.1.2 Outcome Space
In the field of automated negotiation, preferences are typically visualized
through an outcome space plot. The axes are utilities of Player A and B.
Possible outcomes ω ∈ Ω are mapped to (uA(ω), uB(ω)). Fig. 4.2 shows this
plot for our negotiation process. In a), the Pareto frontier is shown by the
right-most edges of the polytope.
By theorems of fixed points and the simplex algorithm [85, 16], the
vertices in the outcome space must come from the vertices in the action
space [0, 1]3. The action space vertices that outline the frontier are found to
be (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1). Intuitively, these are points that offer
the greatest marginal utilities to P1 and P2, based on their value weights
wA = (1, 2, 3) and wB = (3, 2, 1). The piece-wise equation for the Pareto
Frontier PF (UA, UB) is given as follows, in Equation 4.8:
PF (UA, UB) =

UB + 13UA − 6 = 0 for 0 ≥ UA ≥ 3
UB + UA − 8 = 0 for 3 ≥ UA ≥ 5
UB + 3UA − 18 = 0 for 5 ≥ UA ≥ 1
(4.8)
This equation allows us to calculate the bid distribution and determine the
efficiency of an agent’s bid strategy, provided in Section A.2 in the Ap-
pendix. Furthermore, the Nash Solution (maxUAUB) lies at (4, 4) given
by the offer (0, 0.5, 1), provides a benchmark for the fairness when playing
against behavior-based agents.
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4.2 Acceptance Strategy
4.2.1 Behavioral dynamics: Cliff-walking vs optimal play
The central question for an acceptance strategy is when given an offer,
whether or not to accept or wait for potentially better future offers. How-
ever, if the agent fails to accept before the deadline, then the conflict deal
is enacted and both agents do not receive any reward. Given a discount
rate and opponent concession factor, the goal is to find the best moment to
accept an offer, inferring from their prior offers.
Thus, the acceptance strategy can be seen as an optimal stopping prob-
lem with an additional cliff-walking problem to solve. Fig. 4.3 shows the
loss, rewards, and playing time as the network trains against a linear agent
(c = 1.0) with no discount (d = 1.0). Through stochastic sampling of new
points, the agent notices greater reward by waiting, illustrated by gradual
trends in playing time (green). However, once the agent reaches the dead-
line at 20 rounds, the conflict deal is enacted and a reward of −1 is issued,
producing a large loss. We present only the multivariate case, as results for
the univariate case are the same but with lower complexity.
Figure 4.3: Loss, rewards and total time of the DRL agent training against a
time-based agent with c = 1.0. After a few epochs of random search, the agent
learns that increased playtime comes with greater reward. However, as this time
increase to the deadline,the reward drops sharply.
To analyze the stopping time, we consider the evolution of acceptance
probabilities during gameplay against time-based opponents. Fig. 4.4 shows
the logit values used in Eq. 3.3 and acceptance probabilities against Boul-
ware, Linear, and Conceder agents.
The first row shows the acceptance probabilities at each time step. The
cumulative probability (orange) denotes the likelihood the game ends at a
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of acceptance probabilities and logit values without dis-
counting (d = 1.0). Row 1 shows the acceptance probabilities at each time step
(blue), the cumulative probability of first success (orange), and max value at each
time step. The pink point denotes the optimal value (Eq. 4.5). As the concession
factor c increases, stopping time decreases. Row 2 shows where the logits "change
places," corresponding to where the cumulative probability is maximal.
certain time step, given as:
Pcum(t) = Pt(Accept)
t−1∏
i=0
Pi(Reject) (4.9)
Since the discount rate is 1.0, the optimal value is waiting until the final
point in time. The decrease in stoppage time shown by the right-shifting
cumulative probability is sub-optimal, although this is not uncommon in
conservative agents. In the value function (blue, second row), there is also a
slight decrease after the logit values cross. This indicates that the expected
reward at these times may be the same.
Another way to see this is to consider the marginal utility over time.
Since Boulware agents only concede towards the end, the Neural agent is
forced to wait to achieve comparable results, whereas it may be “satisfied"
earlier against Conceders. The marginal utility of the Boulware agent is
thus much greater towards the end, whereas marginal utility is high at the
beginning against Conceders. Explicitly, for U = 1− 1 + ( tT ) 1c = ( tT ) 1c , the
expression for marginal utility is:
∂U(c)
∂t
= 1
cT
1
c
t
1−c
c (4.10)
This analysis is corroborated further once we introduce the discount rate.
Fig. 4.5 shows the acceptance probabilities and logits once discounting is
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of acceptance probabilities and logit values with discount.
Row one shows the acceptance probabilities at each time step (blue), the cumulative
probability of the first success (orange), and the pink point denotes the theoretical
maximum prescribed by Equation 4.5. As the discount rate increases, the optimal
maximum and stoppage time decreases.
introduced. Looking at the red curve, d = 0.99 has positive marginal utility
and for d = 0.85, the marginal utility is negative from time step 7 onwards.
For d = 0.95, the utility function is relatively flat after time step 10, which
means the marginal utility is close to 0. Here, we observe the greatest time
deviation.
4.2.2 Marginal Analysis: Marginal Utility determines Error
Due to the stochastic nature of deep learning, it’s difficult to construct a
precise mathematical proof of how changes in marginal utilities push against
each other. However, we can test this empirically. The neural agent played
against a set of different agents, with concession factors of 0.95, 1.5, 2, 3, 5,
10. In Fig. 4.6a), the curves show our max utility (Equation 4.1) and the
red dot shows the optimal stopping time given by Equation 4.5. Note, as
c increases, the curves grow sharper and since c > 1, the magnitude of the
second derivative strictly increases.
Fig. 4.6b) shows an inverse relationship between the time error and the
reward error. The “peakier" the curve, the more likely the Neural net selects
the optimal time. However, deferral by even one time step leads to large
amounts of diminished utility, hence creating the larger reward error. In
contrast, using the second derivative derived in Equation 4.6, we observe
in Fig. 4.6c) that as the second derivative approaches 0, the time error
increases.
Having shown what produces the reward and time errors, we can address
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our sub-problem about limitations. For future work, we may dynamically
reduce the learning rate using the second derivative and distance to the
deadline for better convergence. Numerical results are summarized in Ta-
ble 4.1.
Figure 4.6: Optimals vs second derivative from 100 gameplays. Rew. error scaled
by 3.
c 0.3 0.95 1.5 2 3 5 10
Time Error 3.95 11.62 7.81 5.86 4.99 3.0 1.0
Reward Error -0.0234 -0.712 -1.054 -1.278 -1.366 -1.302 -0.907
Second Deriv. (x100) 0.0722 -0.094 -0.152 -0.223 -0.389 -0.777 -1.886
Table 4.1: Tabular Results of 100 gameplays sat different concessions.
4.2.3 Preference-based concessions produce fairer outcomes
Finally, we consider optimality. Since the final offers depend on the time-
based agent, so do the optimality measures. Thus, the way opponent agent
algorithmically constructs their offers will appear differently in the outcome
space. Fig. 4.7 shows the distribution of accepted offers after 400 gameplays,
with c = 1.0 and d = 0.94. The first randomly samples from the plane that
satisfies the following condition:
Ud(t) = wTX = w1x1 + w2x2 + w3x3 (4.11)
where Ud is the decision utility at time t and wi is the weighed utility for issue
xi. The second uses a preference-based, monotonic concession strategy—
it satisfies Equation 4.11, but concedes starting from the issue it values
the least (min{w1, w2, w3}). Multivariate Gaussian noise with a standard
deviation of 0.05 is added to prevent deterministic offers. When the time-
based agent uses preference-based, monotonic concession strategies then this
guarantees offers to lie on the Pareto Frontier.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of final, accepted offers (c = 1.0, d = 0.94). The
preference-based bidding (red) produces offers on the Pareto Frontier. Planar sam-
pling (magenta) occur in intervals as the time-based agent samples points based on
uB(t).
dNash BD(Ω) (dPareto) Av. Reward Av. Time
Planar Samp. 1.64 0.54 1.84 4.89
Preference-based Concession 0.46 0.00 2.61 5.7
Pure Random 1.92 1.24 N/A N/A
Table 4.2: Sampling Results
The preference-based method produces offers that lie on the Pareto Fron-
tier. Because of this optimality, the neural agents play on average a longer
time when its opponent follows this strategy. Random planar sampling
yields considerably better results than pure random sampling, with a bid
distribution difference of 0.7 (shown in Table 4.2). The magenta points in
Fig. 4.7 arise because, for every time step, the decision utility is fixed for
fixed c. Table 4.2 summarizes the mean outcomes of the gameplays, with
the preference-based concession performing the best.
4.3 Bidding Strategy
4.3.1 Precision in Single-Issue Negotiation
Before evaluating performance on the multivariate case, we verify the uni-
variate case. Fig. 4.8 shows the action policies given by Cauchy distributions
for specific decision utilities. As the concession factor increases, the distri-
bution of means transfers from right- to left-skew. This can be attributed to
the magnitude of the marginal utility. Cauchy means are clustered tightly
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Figure 4.8: Cauchy distributions based on concession factor and decision utility.
When c is low (Boulware), Cauchy means are clustered tightly for low t, spread out
for high t. When c is high (Conceder), values are clustered for high t and spread
out for low t.
for the Boulware agent when t is low, as the marginal utility is low early on.
However, as time passes and the Boulware agent begins to concede greatly,
the distance between means increase. Conversely, when the opponent is
a Conceder, concession begins early, so marginal utility is large when t is
small, leading to right-skew. The Conceder case is not as pronounced as
the Boulware case due to the cliff at the deadline. As expected, means are
spaced out linearly against linear agents.
In sum, the change in decision utility affects the distribution of the
means. For completeness, Fig. A.1 in the Appendix shows a heat map of
how the neural agent’s utility changes in respect to the opponent’s.
4.3.2 Multivariate Training Dynamics
Next, we present the multivariate case. We trained on a grid of concession
factors for fixed discount rates. We denote the three issues as issues X, Y ,
and Z. Fig. 4.9 shows the first 1000 epochs, using a multivariate Cauchy
distribution with c = 0.3 and no discount. Unlike training Accept Net, cliff-
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Figure 4.9: Training statistics of the Cauchy Offer Net. The neural agent learns
to induce rejection from the time-based agent so negotiation ends near the deadline.
walking is less present, as the final action (accept) lies with the opponent
and time-based agents are very likely to accept. The agent quickly learns to
wait longer, converging at a higher time step.
However, unlike accept net, this is not simply a binary action where
rejecting an offer leads to the next round. The agent has to produce offers
that induce rejection from the time-based agent. Fig. 4.10 shows how Cauchy
means vary over time. The first row shows the individual Cauchy means for
issues X, Y and Z respectively. Shown in light blue is also the normalized
utility (divided by the total possible utility of 6) and the equilibrium payout
from 100 gameplays. The second row shows the opponent’s decision function
(blue) and our maximum utility at each time step. The value estimate given
by the value net is shown in green. At the bottom, the red line shows the
mean stoppage time, with the distribution of times shown with a kernel
density estimate.
Since the cliff-walking aspect is not as prominent (the only case where
the conflict deal is enacted is if the agent proposes the full amount at the
end), all stoppage times are relatively high, although diminishing stoppage
time is still observed when the marginal utility is lower. For instance, when
c = 1, the marginal utility is constantly 120 and the second derivative is 0,
the stoppage time is 15.1. Comparably, when c = 0.3, the marginal utility
is increasing and the mean stoppage time is 16.9.
Note issue X varies the most, either through concession (Fig. 4.10a)) or
increase of the offer value as shown in Fig. 4.10c). At a glance, this may be
counter-intuitive, since a change in Y or Z would yield the most marginal
gains for the agent. However, the opponent values issue X the most, which
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Figure 4.10: Variation of Cauchy means over time with no discount rate. The
expected reward hovers around 84 percent of the full utility. All stoppage times are
high, but still decreases as the concession factor increases due to reduced marginal
utility.
means X produces the largest amount of gradient for the least amount of
loss during concession. As a result, the agent learns the negotiate close or
along the Pareto Frontier, which we show later in the distributional analy-
sis. Secondly, there is a clear progression between Boulware and Conceder
strategies when comparing the linear agent to the Boulware agent.
Additionally, in the bottom row, the green value function remains fairly
constant throughout, until the drop off towards the end induced by the dead-
line. The value function remains flat since the expected value is constant—
so long as the neural agent sticks to its strategy, the payout will not change.
While performance is not optimal, it achieves more than 80% of the op-
timal which is typical of risk-averse agents whose behaviors are generally
conservative on estimates [68].
Next, we compare this to the case when discounting is introduced, using
the beta distribution as an example. Fig. 4.9 shows the gameplays of a
neural agent using the beta-distribution. The first row shows the evolution
of the multivariate distribution means (blue, orange and green for X, Y ,
and Z respectively), the evolution of the normalized utility (black), and
the reward under 100 gameplays. The second row shows the theoretical
maximums (orange) and mean stoppage time (red). Immediately, we observe
that the agent begins sampling around the same initial values, then alters its
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Figure 4.11: Variation of beta distribution means over time with discount rate.
Each mean is calculated using Equation 3.8. Gameplay results fall consistently
within 10% of the expected optimal stoppage time. Values begin around the same
region with high variance as the agent is unsure what opponent it is playing against,
but decreases with time as certainty towards its opponent’s strategy grows. c = 1.
strategy as it learns more about the opponent. The way it alters its strategy
varies depending on its own inherent discount rate, which demonstrates
adaptability.
Finally, issue X is again the issue with the most variation, with the same
argument that its change produces the highest gradients during gameplay,
due to the opponent valuing X the most. Mean stoppage time is close to
the optimal, with 8% mean deviation. While this is not precisely optimal,
it is quite good. To understand what causes this limitation, we analyze the
probability distributions.
4.3.3 Offer Strategy requires Sensitivity to Variance
We compare the outcome space of agents using Gaussian, Cauchy, and beta
distributions, after playing 3000 rounds against batches of mixed opponents.
Fig. 4.12 shows the distribution of final offers given by each agent, with the
addition of a random agent, when playing against a linear agent with no
discount rate. Since time-based agents make monotonic concessions, lower
y-values imply longer gameplay times.
As expected, the random agent produces offers distributed randomly in
the outcome space. At a glance, the beta distribution outcomes bear the
most resemblance to the random agent. This is due to the beta distribution’s
initial high variance. This can be adjusted by increasing the constant added
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of outcomes based on different sampling distributions.
Neural agents were trained on 3000 games, then played against a linear agent. The
random agent plays. Statistics are summarized in Table 4.3
to the initial values of α and β. However, also note that the scattered points
are on average greater than 3.
The normal distribution produces the most consistent results, with re-
sults clustered around the (0, 1, 1) vertex. The Cauchy distribution performs
similarly, but on average performs better, with a maximum value of 5.5 and
average 5.3. However, it also has a much greater variance when compared
to the Normal distribution. We can conclude convergence to optimal play
requires sufficient initial variance to prevent convergence to local optima.
Additionally, the maximum value achieved by any of these distributions was
achieved by the beta distribution. These values are presented in Table 4.3.
dNash BD(Ω) Av. Reward Av. Time Reward. Range
Rand. Samp. 1.901 1.246 NA NA NA
Beta 1.741 1.0018 3.587 10.11 5.378
Normal 1.585 0.0815 4.993 11.03 0.294
Cauchy 2.261 0.218 5.051 14.66 4.403
Table 4.3: Gameplay outcomes from 400 games against linear agent. Sampling
through the normal distribution givese the fairest and most consistent results,
whereas the Cauchy provides the highest expected reward.
The normal distribution produces consistent results, with the lowest bid
distribution and reward range, and also is closest to the Nash Solution.
In expectation, the Cauchy distribution produces better results but with
a higher bid distribution and is farther from the Nash Solution. However,
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having a large distance from the Nash Point is not necessarily bad, as ex-
ploiting the opponent’s strategy leads to higher rewards. Without discount,
the neural agent can improve its own outcomes by waiting.
The four panels in Fig. 4.12 reveal two opposing forces that make con-
tinuous DRL difficult in this domain. Convergence to optima requires high
variance, yet avoiding the conflict deal requires low variance to prevent sam-
pling the conflict deal. For further proof, consider that the time error de-
creases with discount rate, comparing Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11. The discount
rate shifts the optimal away from the cliff, thus sampling around the optimal
produces less error due to slow change in marginal utility, and the smooth
reward function allows more accurate function approximation [40, 76].
The next step is to compare the variances of the three distributions,
and their sensitivity to parameter change. The Normal’s variance is directly
parametrized by the action network. In contrast, the variance of the beta
distribution depends on both shape parameters α and β:
V arβ =
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
which means large, simultaneous increases in both α and β is required to
lower variance, leading to slow convergence. In contrast, the Cauchy distri-
bution famously does not have a theoretical mean, variance or kurtosis, due
to laws of integration.
This points to why the Cauchy distribution works better, all things held
equal. It is parameterized as directly as the normal distribution, but is also
has "heavy-tailed" and "peakier" than the Gaussian. This slower decay in the
tails means lower variance sensitivity, hence avoiding convergence to local
optima. At the same time, the Cauchy distribution also has a much higher
peak than the Gaussian, which means there is less cost in accuracy when
sampling.
In regards to our study’s objectives: the results from Sections 4.2 and
Section 4.3 show slow convergence when variance is high and sub-optimal
convergence when variance is low due to lack of action exploration as the
primary limitation. This suggests the learning rate can be adjusted through
marginal utilities, the distribution’s kurtosis (peaky-ness and tail-behavior),
and the variance sensitivity for faster convergence and efficient outcomes. A
more aggressive learning rate can curtail distributions with lower variance
sensitivity. Furthermore, variation in concession factor and discount rate
yields different strategies from Offer Net, thus demonstrating adaptivity.
4.4 Self-Play: The Emergence of Fairness
So far, we have addressed sub-problems related to training barriers and
demonstrated exploitative capabilities against time-based agents. While
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play against time-based agents provides clear benchmarks due to mono-
tonic time-based concession, play against behavior-based agents is required
to evaluate behavioral traits such as fairness. In this section, we first present
a game-theoretic framework of our games, then the results for single- and
multi-issue self-play, then against two variants of tit-for-tat agents.
4.4.1 Game-theoretic Framework
We introduce a few game-theoretic concepts required for in-depth behav-
ioral analysis. An extensive game consists of a set of players N , a set of
sequences H that denote possible game trajectories. A game tree describes
this trajectory of states, round-by-round. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) denotes
an outcome where no player wants to willingly deviate. In extensive games,
a strategy profile s∗ is an NE if
O(s∗−1, s∗i ) ≥ O(s∗−1, si) ∀si ∈ Si
Si denotes the strategy set of player i. Let (< a1, a2, ... >,< b1, b2, ... >)
denote the strategy profiles, where each bracket contains a player’s sequence
of moves [54].
Figure 4.13: Centipede Game
D D D D D D
CCCCCC1 1 12 2 2
(0.9, 0.1) (0.2, 1.8) (2.7, 0.3) (0.4, 3.6) (4.5, 0.5) (0.6, 5.4)
(3.5, 3.5)
Figure 4.14: Game tree of the centipede game. Every round, the "pie" grows by
1, ending with 7. Players can split it evenly at the end (cooperate every turn), or
defect. By backwards induction, the SPNE is (< D,D,D >,< D,D,D >), with
reward= (0.9, 0.1).
In extensive games, the concept of sub-games describes part of the game
tree which function as a game itself [54]. Fig. 4.13 shows the game tree of the
centipede game, a canonical game in game theory, and Fig. 4.15 shows the
game tree of a bargaining game. In this instance of the centipede, the total
size of the pie increases by 1 at every time step. The players can choose to
wait or defect. Consider the rightmost node in Fig. 4.13 labeled 2, denoting
P2’s decision to cooperate or defect. Since the pay-off of defecting yields a
reward of 5.4 over 3.5 from cooperating, P2 will defect if they are rational.
The sub-tree stemming from 2 can then be reduced to (0.6, 5.4).
Once P1 realizes P2 will defect, P1 will also defect as this yields a higher
reward. This process continues until P1 defects in round 1. The process of
iteratively reducing up the tree is known as backwards-induction. The result
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 33
at the end is a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), a type of NE
that is also the equilibria of sub-games. The SPNE in this game is found to
be < D,D,D >,< D,D,D >. Ironically, if both players waited until the
end, they would receive higher rewards. Hence, for the centipede game, we
expect to see cooperative agents wait until the end, while rational agents
defect at the beginning.
Figure 4.15: Bargaining Game
R,O D D D D D
CCCCCC1 1 12 2 2
(x1, y1) (x2, y2) (x3, y3) (x4, y4) (x5, y5) (x6, y6)
(0, 0)
Figure 4.16: Game tree of a bargaining game. With an initial size of 1, the size
diminishes by 0.9 each time step, ending with 0 after the sixth and last round, when
the conflict deal is enacted. The sum of the rewards are subject to xi+yi = 0.9t−1.
4.4.2 Univariate self-play results
Before training with self-play in the multi-issue domain, we consider a sim-
plified version. Instead of giving offers in [0, 1]3, consider the case where bid-
ding actions are constrained to a binary decision—either offering (0.5, 0.5)
or (0.9, 0.1). Thus, agents can either offer a low amount to their opponent
(rational behavior), or a fair amount. These four choices can be summarized
as:
(L,L): Offer low, reject nothing. This is typically the SPNE, thus rational
(G1).
(H,L): Offer high, reject nothing. This is altruistic (G2).
(H,H): Offer high, accept high. This agent is fair (G3).
(L,H): Offer low, accept high. This one is often disregarded, as it is a hardliner
G4.
Fig. 4.17 shows the training results for the bargaining and centipede
game, with the discount factors set to 0.9 and 1.3 respectively. Note, by
setting the discount rate to greater than 1, the bargaining game effectively
becomes a more complex version of the centipede game. For the bargaining
game in Fig. 4.17a), the reward for P2 is initially low, then increases with
time approaching 1 round. Conversely, the reward for P1 decreases. We
infer that P2 learns to reject P1’s offer, and P1 learns to accept. This play
is close to rationally optimal. If the agents were perfectly rational, the game
would end immediately. However, P2 adopts a strategy that forces play to
go on— we analyze the reason for this further in the multivariate case.
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Figure 4.17: Training results for self-play, for the centipede game and bargaining
game. Depicted are P1’s results(blue), P2’s results(orange) and the total playing
time (green).
Figure 4.18: Comparison of offer and acceptance logits for the (a) bargaining and
(b) centipede game. In both, Offer Net initially gives rational offers, then over time
shifts to fair offers to increase acceptance probability. Accept Net accepts early in
the bargaining game, and late for the centipede game, aligned with the optimal
stopping times.
In the centipede game in Fig. 4.17b), the players learn to play close to
20 rounds, maximizing the "interest" accumulated. The total size of the pie
is 1.319 = 146. By the final round, P1 holds a mixed strategy yields 47%
rational offers (0.9, 0.1) and 53% fair offers (0.5, 0.5). As the time series
shown are the running averages, the big dips show brief spans where the
P1 adopts a fair strategy. These dynamics can be seen more clearly by
observing how decision logits evolve during gameplay. Fig. 4.18 shows the
probabilities of giving rational and fair offers at each time step, and the
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probabilities of accepting an offer (for one game trajectory).
In both cases, agents start-out giving low offers to their opponents. How-
ever, as time moves forward, the probability of a fair offer increases, to
increase the probability of acceptance. For the bargaining game (a), the
stoppage time reaches a maximum close to the beginning. This suggests the
network, through gameplay, learns outcomes similar to backward-induction.
Similarly in the centipede game, the network learns to wait, leveraging “in-
terest" to accept near to the deadline, which also indicates cooperative behav-
ior. Together, we conclude the neural agent learns to accept optimally and
as time moves forward, shift its behavior from G1 (rational) to G3 (fair).
4.4.3 Multivariate Self-play
Now, we extend analysis to the continuous, multi-issue case. Fig. 4.19 shows
the training dynamics of the Offer Net and Accept Net, whose final rewards
are plotted per epoch, with the discount rate set to 0.95. Initially, the Offer
Net (blue) has higher reward— as long as some reward is given to Accept
Net, the Accept Net will accept it. However, around epoch 1600 the Accept
Net learns to invoke the conflict deal. This is demarcated by the large drop
in reward for both blue and orange to −1. After which, the Offer Net must
concede some by offering a fairer amount.
Figure 4.19: Multivariate self-play for negotiation. Offer Net concedes value after
Accept Net adopts a mixed strategy with the conflict deal threat.
In sum, by including some probability of the conflict deal, neural agents
force a counter-offer that is fairer. This departs from classical game theory,
as an example of a non-credible threat. A non-credible threat describes
actions that perfectly rational agents will not carry out, as it would also
leave themselves worse off [54]. The adaption of non-credible threats is also
observable in the uni-variate centipede game, with periods of dips in P1’s
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reward, following the conflict deal. For discounted bargaining, convergence
to low playing time suggests that heavy discounting acts as a similar threat—
if you do not offer a fair deal, I will drag on the negotiation. By keeping
non-credible threats part of a mixed strategy, fair outcomes can evolve.
This is significant because it agrees with results from evolutionary game
theory. We previously mentioned in Section 4.4.1, that reputation produces
fairness in the repeated ultimatum game. Nowak et al. showed this through
the same, exact simplified mini-game (bids restricted to low and fair offers),
then full bidding space using population-based experiments [52]. Popula-
tions of G1, G2, and G3 played against each other, and “reproduced" based
on their utility. After many rounds, results showed that the rational agent
(G1) dominated. However, if the prior acceptance history was available,
which showed agents rejecting below a certain threshold, then a population
of fair agents (G3) who offered high and accepted high would emerge.
In other words, there is a strong similarity between non-credible threats
in our neural agent and the rejection of low offers (using reputation) in
evolutionary strategies. This is by far the most interesting result, and it’s
important to note evolutionary methods and RL are often framed as com-
peting choices for agent design [67]. Similar results produced in these two
fields may drive future research directions.
4.4.4 Against Tit-for-Tat Agents
Figure 4.20: Evolution of play against relative tit-for-tat agents.
Finally, we present results against relative TFT and the Bayesian TFT
agent. Since this investigation studies whether the acceptance and bidding
strategy can adapt and induce promising counter-bids, each game is designed
as follows: the TFT agent makes a bid, then the neural agent makes an
acceptance decision and counter-bids. Thus, the game can only end on the
neural agent’s acceptance.
Against the relative TFT agent with no discounting (Fig. 4.20), the
neural agent converges to the (0, 1, 1) vertex. Yellow represents the ending
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epoch and we observe the neural agent’s utility is greater than 3. Notably,
the TFT agent makes offers opposite of the Pareto Frontier. This arises as
the relative TFT agent measures concession with respect to its own utility.
As we’ve analyzed in the time-based opponents, DRL agents are prone to
adjusting variables that yield the greatest rewards and lowest losses. To the
TFT agent, this is reversed, prompting it to concede the issue it values most
and propose away from the Pareto frontier. This demonstrates adaptivity.
Figure 4.21: Evolution of play against Bayesian tit-for-tat agents. The agent
learns to accept early and around the Nash point.
In contrast, the neural agent cooperates with the Bayesian TFT agent. In
Fig. 4.21a (epoch 0) the neural agent performs randomly and suboptimally.
Note, the color bar represents time step. However, the bid direction drifts
towards the (0, 1, 1) vertex (Figs 4.21(b) and (c)). By epoch 1450, the neural
agent learns to induce results near the Nash point, in only four moves due
to the discount rate.
With results from time-based agents and self-play, our analysis shows
that when concession is necessary, the bidding strategy gravitates toward
to (0, 1, 1). This ensures near Pareto Optimal payoff if its offer is accepted.
Exploitation occurs against time-based and relative TFT agents, while fairer
outcomes arise with more complex agents.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Discussion
Bilateral negotiation presents a unique domain that combines discrete and
continuous control problems. Furthermore, the deadline produces a utility
function analogous to cliff-walking. This paper is a fundamental evaluation
of actor-critic models for negotiation, measuring its ability to exploit, adapt,
and cooperate.
The neural agent shows clear exploitative behavior against time-based
agents. For acceptance, the neural agent demonstrates precise logit switch-
ing behavior, in transitions between rejecting and accepting offers. The
acceptance strategy resembles a conservative agent, accepting a little before
the optimal time. For the bidding strategy, we evaluated the use of Normal,
Cauchy, and beta distributions for continuous control. The Cauchy has the
highest reward, but the Normal is more consistent. The neural agent learns
ways to evaluate the opponent, such as maintaining high mean, high initial
variance to ensure enough rejections, before lowering the variance to more
deterministic outcomes. This also demonstrates adaptability to concession
and discounting.
Time-based experiments reveal the barriers to optimal convergence.
We discover the error in stoppage time can be explained by the change in
marginal utility (second derivative) and cliff-walking: the agent waits for
higher rewards, then is punished aggressively due to enacting the conflict
deal. The primary factors that influence the bidding optimality is trade-
offs in variance (i.e.the beta distribution suffers from slow convergence due
to low variance sensitivity). High variance is required to seek out optimal
strategies, but low variance helps avoid the conflict deal. The peakiness of
the Cauchy and its heavy tails makes it a suitable candidate.
The neural agent was also shown to be cooperative and adaptive.
When playing against time-based agents with preference-based concessions,
offers are accepted along the Pareto Frontier and produce the highest ex-
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pected reward. Self-play in the centipede game shows agents are willing to
accrue interest, which demonstrates cooperation over rationality. Against
simple Bayesian TFT agents, the neural agent learns to quickly arrive at
the Nash Solution, resulting in win-win cooperation. Since all results arise
from a single neural architecture, the neural agent shows significant adapt-
ability. Most importantly, the neural agent forces fairer results by either
1) utilizing the conflict deal or 2) levying discounting to force fairer offers.
There is a strong similarity between non-credible threats in our neural agent
and the rejection of low offers (using reputation) in evolutionary strategies.
It’s important to note evolutionary methods and RL are often framed as
competing choices for agent design [67]. Beyond theoretical interest in di-
verging from classical game theory, these results may guide the design of
fairer negotiations, with EGT from a population perspective and DRL from
the individual agent’s perspective.
Before discussing future work, I’ll note what didn’t work. Initially, the
use of LSTMs seemed promising due to its success in natural language nego-
tiation generation. However, there the action domain is discrete and limited.
5.1.1 Evaluation and Future Work
One weakness of this study is it studies a specific preference ordering. For
the scenario, promising avenues include variations in the utility functions,
as there are six combinations of preference orderings for three issues. More
importantly is the inclusion of more complicated behavior-based agents. One
barrier to this is, unlike the iterated prisoner dilemma that has hundreds
of established strategies, we lack a repository that collects these strategies,
such as the Axelrod library for the IPD [1].
However, this is quickly changing. An annual negotiation competition
that began in 2010 [8] collects strong bots into the Genius Environment [42],
maintained by Tim Baarslag. I anticipate running the neural agent against
these bots, to understand how DRL performs in a tournament setting and
against more complicated strategies.
Another weakness of this study is experimentation with design choices
(learning methodology), although this was not possible given the focus
of this dissertation was behavioral analysis. A separate study with a deep
learning focus could scope-out the impact of neural architecture (the type
of non-linearity and number of layers) and hyper-parameters (learning rate,
reward discounting and the use of schedulers). Additionally, increasing the
complexity of the algorithm may improve performance, such as increasing
the input space to include n-prior moves against trajectory-based opponents,
or the use of Monte-Carlo Tree Search and rollout [71].
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Policy-Gradient Theorem
The policy gradient theorem states the change in scalar is proportional to
change in policy weights. More specifically, this is given as:
∇J(θ) ∝ Σsµ(s)Σqpi(s, a)∇pi(a|s, θ)
Here, µ(s) denotes the on-policy distribution of a state under policy pi. We
can think of this as the frequency a state has occurred. qpi(s, a) is the value of
the state-action pair and ∇pi(a|s, θ) is the change in the policy distribution.
What this says is a positive change in J(θ) can be produced a proportional
shift in the policy. A full proof can be found in Chapter 13 of [76].
A.2 Point to Line Calculation
The general form of the closest distance from a point to line is
d(ax+ by + c = 0, (x0, y0)) =
|ax0 + by0 + c|√
a2 + b2
. (A.1)
The Pareto Frontier s given by Eq. 4.8. Hence, the distance of a point
P = (xp, yp) to the Pareto Frontier is:
min
{ |xp + 13yp − 6|√
10
9
,
|xp + yp − 8|√
2
,
|xp + 3yp − 18|√
10
}
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A.3 Actor-Critic Playout Implementation
for e in epochs do
while Not accepted and t <deadline do
P1 offers;
if P2 Accepts then
Collect States for both players ;
Collect Acceptance Actions and Rewards for both players;
else
P2 Offers;
Swap Places (P1 receives then counter offers);
t+ = 1;
end
end
Calculate Critic and Actor Loss for both Accept Net and Offer
Net;
Backprop on both networks;
end
Algorithm 3: Implementation of negotiation playout and training
pipeline
A.4 Change in Univariate Mean Estimation
The y-axis shows the decision utility at a given time, which is inversely
related to the concession factor. The higher the decision utility, the more
Boulware the agent is. The concession value can be converted with c = ln
t
T
lnUd .
Figure A.1: Cauchy means based on opponent decision utility and time. The
decision utility serves as a proxy for concession, as the higher the decision utility,
the more Boulware the opponent.
